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Note
A Case for Compulsory Licensing in Instances of
Reverse Trademark Confusion
LAUREN STRAIGHT
Trademark remedies in cases of reverse confusion are economically inefficient.
Junior users in the best position to take economic advantage of marks are sometimes
unable to do so due to prior use of a mark by a much smaller, remote senior user.
This creates economic inefficiencies and leaves market share unutilized. For this
reason, TRIPS needs to be revised to allow for a limited system of compulsory
licensing for trademarks in reverse confusion cases. A system of compulsory
licensing for trademarks would allow the person or company in the best position to
use and gain market share from a trademark, to have access to it. It would
accelerate competition, one of the goals of intellectual property law. A well-written
remedial scheme, including compulsory licensing, can maximize the economic value
of trademarks, while still avoiding consumer confusion. Compulsory licensing can
be found in both patent and copyright law, and thus can logically be extended to
trademark law. A hypothetical “Trademark Panel,” similar to the Copyright
Royalty Judges Program, could use a set of criteria to decide when a compulsory
license would be appropriate in trademark law, and how to establish an appropriate
licensing fee.
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A Case for Compulsory Licensing in Instances of
Reverse Trademark Confusion
LAUREN STRAIGHT *
INTRODUCTION
Trademark law serves two primary functions. First, it serves to protect
consumers from being confused about the source and origin of goods and
services in order to protect consumer expectations about those goods and
services.1 In other words, trademarks help consumers identify goods and
services, as well as predict their quality. Second, trademark law offers
protections to producers of those goods and services by allowing them to
foster goodwill.2 As such, trademark law must balance protecting consumers
from confusion, while also encouraging both innovation and competition.
Traditional trademark infringement cases deal with “forward
confusion,” where a junior user is accused of using a well-known senior
user’s mark on the junior user’s own goods or services.3 Under forward
confusion, consumers are likely to believe that the goods of the junior user
are associated with the senior source, which allows the junior user to trade
on the goodwill of the senior user. When this happens, the court is expected
to rule in favor of the senior user and enjoin the junior user’s use of the mark
in order to minimize consumer confusion and protect the senior user’s
reputation.4 Thus, the dual purposes of trademark law—protecting
consumers as well as trademark owners—seem to be in harmony.
*
J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Connecticut School of Law. Thank you to Professor Kathleen
Lombardi for contributing her time and expertise throughout this process, and Professor Steven Wilf for
inspiring the idea of this Note. Many thanks to the members of Connecticut Law Review for their diligent
efforts and many edits. Finally, thank you to my family and friends for their constant support and
encouragement.
1
See Nat’l Color Lab’ys, Inc. v. Philip’s Foto Co., 273 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (noting
that “an unfair competition suit involves the public’s interest in protection against deceit as to the sources
of its purchases”).
2
The federal court in the Southern District of New York has noted that trademarks encourage “the
businessman’s right to enjoy business earned through investment in the good will and reputation attached
to a trade name.” Id.
3
A senior user of a trademark or service mark is the first entity to adopt and use the mark. Lucent Info.
Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 186 F.3d 311, 316 (3d Cir. 1999). A junior user of a trademark is a second
user, “regardless of whether it adopts and uses a mark in a geographically remote location.” Id.
4
See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 161 (9th Cir. 1963)
(enjoining use of defendant’s BLACK & WHITE mark on alcoholic beverages due to likelihood of
confusion with plaintiff’s mark); Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 152 (2d Cir. 2003)
(enjoining defendant’s use of the mark VIRGIN for telephones and telephone-related services due to a
“likel[ihood] to cause substantial consumer confusion” with plaintiff’s mark); McDonald’s Corp. v.
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In contrast, “reverse confusion” occurs when a junior user adopts a mark
already in use by a senior user; however, the junior user tends to be much
larger than the senior user and is able to saturate the market with advertising
and other promotions of the mark.5 The confusion is thus “reversed” because
consumers might believe that the junior user was actually the originator of
the mark and that the senior user is the infringer. The senior user will argue
that this could harm its goodwill and reputation.6
In such cases of reverse confusion, the interests of consumers seem to
be at odds with the interests of the trademark owner. While the trademark
owner would certainly be better off if the larger, junior user was enjoined
from using the mark, the consuming public may be harmed by that outcome.
This is because the larger, junior user is better positioned to make more
efficient use of a trademark, without confusing consumers as to the origin of
source (since most consumers would tend to associate the mark with the
junior user after the more aggressive advertising campaign). This is
especially true when the senior user is in a remote area, leaving much room
for expansion of the mark by the junior user. Consumers are sophisticated
and will be able to tell the difference between two different brands sharing
similar marks. In other words, when a reverse confusion case is brought,
consumers have already begun to associate the quality and source of the
goods or services in the market at large with the junior user. Therefore,
forcing the junior user to change the mark would be harmful to consumers
and would leave market share on the table.
Thus, while trying to meet its dual purposes, trademark law has fallen a
bit short in terms of its remedial function when it comes to cases of reverse
confusion—that is, what happens when a smaller, senior user’s trademark is
infringed by a larger, but junior, user. While consumer protection is often
touted as the top priority in trademark law, consumers’ interests are not
really being protected at all in cases of reverse confusion, because a great
deal of market share is being left on the table by a small, senior user
warehousing a mark. This is harmful to consumers because it leads to
decreased competition and the inability of consumers to continue using a
junior user’s brand that they have already begun to recognize under the mark
without heavy transaction costs related to learning a new branding scheme.
Additionally, remedies in trademark law in cases of reverse confusion
have been applied fairly arbitrarily due to confusion in the judiciary about

Druck & Gerner, D.D.S., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127, 1139 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (recommending an injunction
against defendant’s use of MCDENTAL because it was likely to cause confusion with plaintiff’s mark).
5
Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Reverse Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham Trademark Act,
187 A.L.R. Fed. 271 (2003).
6
See, e.g., Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 38–39 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining the
sources of harm to a senior mark owner caused by reverse confusion); Marketquest Grp., Inc. v. BIC
Corp., 862 F.3d 927, 933 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting a concern that consumers would believe the plaintiff
had been acquired by the defendant in a reverse confusion case).
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the role of monetary damages in trademark infringement cases.7 While
punitive damages in trademark infringement awards are technically not
allowed under the Lanham Act,8 some courts may enhance damages when
they believe that a defendant has acted willfully.9 This has the result of
making some plaintiffs far from whole, while others receive a windfall. In
cases of reverse confusion, it is hard to imagine how a plaintiff should ever
be entitled to monetary damages, as it is unlikely they lost many, if any, sales
from the junior user’s adoption of a similar mark. If anything, all a senior
user has lost is the ability to develop market share, which is nearly
impossible to value.
This Note focuses on how trademark remedies in cases of reverse
confusion are economically inefficient. Junior users in the best position to take
economic advantage of marks are sometimes unable to do so due to prior use
of a mark by a much smaller, remote senior user. This creates economic
inefficiencies and leaves plenty of available market share unutilized.
Part I of this Note provides a brief statutory analysis of the remedies
provided by the Lanham Act and how they have been applied to cases of
reverse confusion. Part I also discusses relevant court cases regarding
reverse confusion that have given remedies, based on the Lanham Act, that
I will argue are economically inefficient. This analysis will demonstrate that
a new, more efficient, and sensible approach needs to be established to deal
with cases of reverse confusion.
To create a better remedial trademark regime for reverse confusion, it is
helpful to look to other intellectual property regimes. Part II of this Note will
summarize the compulsory licensing process sometimes used for both the
patent and copyright systems (in the United States and abroad) and analyze
why compulsory licensing is economically effective for those regimes.
Compulsory licensing is used in other regimes to allow junior users to
capitalize on untapped market shares, while compensating a senior user.10
There is no logical reason for not extending this reasoning to trademark law.

7
Compare Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 1992)
(rewarding a huge damages award to a very small senior user), with A & H Sportswear, Co. v. Victoria’s
Secret Stores, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 770, 802 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (rewarding no monetary damages where
senior user’s good comprised 10% of the market share).
8
See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(A)–(C) (1946) (outlining available remedies for trademark infringement,
which does not include punitive damages); Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating “punitive damages are not available under the Lanham Act”).
9
See Nicholas A. Gowen & Peter V. Baugher, Recovering Damages for Trademark Infringement,
101 ILL. BAR J. 148, 151 (2013) (discussing how some courts recognize “willful” infringement that may
justify declaring a case as exceptional and awarding additional fees to a prevailing plaintiff. For example,
courts may award treble damages for intentionally using a counterfeit mark.).
10
Cole M. Fauver, Comment, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666, 667 (1988).
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Part III builds on this discussion to show why the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights11 (“TRIPS”) needs to be
revised to allow for a limited system of compulsory licensing for trademarks
and how this would be economically efficient, specifically in the realm of
reverse confusion cases. A system of compulsory licensing for trademarks
would allow the person or company in the best position to use and gain
market share from a trademark to have access to it. It would accelerate
competition—one of the main goals of intellectual property law. A wellwritten remedial scheme, including compulsory licensing, can both
maximize the economic value of trademarks, while still avoiding consumer
confusion.
I. THE LANHAM ACT
A. Background, Purpose, and Remedies
As far back as the nineteenth century, Congress realized the need to
protect consumers from being confused by counterfeit goods, as well as the
need to protect strong brands.12 Although the first statute providing for
federal trademark registration was enacted by Congress in 1870,13 this Act
was struck down by the United States Supreme Court as unconstitutional
nine years later.14 Modern trademark doctrine was established in 1946 with
the creation of the Lanham Act, which provided for federal registration of
marks used in interstate commerce.15
Under the Lanham Act, the most common remedy in a trademark
infringement suit is a grant of an injunction against the infringer.16 A
plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction in a trademark suit when the
plaintiff demonstrates that there is a “probab[ility of] success on the merits,”
as well as “the possibility of irreparable injury” or “the existence of serious
questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tips sharply

11
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG.
(1994), https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS]. TRIPS is
an international agreement intended to create a global system of protection for intellectual property rights.
See Evelyn Su, Comment, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights and its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 169, 171
(2000) (describing the TRIPS agreement).
12
Kenneth R. Pierce, The Trademark Law Revision Act: Origins of the Use Requirement and an
Overview of the New Federal Trademark Law, 64 FLA. BAR J. 35, 37 (1990) (discussing the first federal
trademark statute enacted in 1870).
13
An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Statutes Relating to Patents and Copyrights, ch.
230, §§ 81–84 (1870), invalidated by In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 88 (1879).
14
In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 88.
15
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2002).
16
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND
POLICY 967 (4th ed. 2014) (stating “[i]n most intellectual property litigation, the principal battle is
resolved by the grant or denial of injunctive relief”).
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in [the plaintiff’s] favor.”17 The goals of the injunction are to stop the
infringer from capitalizing on the goodwill and market share of the senior
user, to protect consumers from being confused about the origin of goods in
the marketplace, and to reduce transaction costs for consumers.18
While an injunction against the infringer’s use of the mark is the most
common remedy, the Lanham Act also created remedies for more egregious
trademark infringement in the form of damages that could include (1) any
profits the defendant made from using the mark, (2) damages sustained by
the plaintiff through the unlawful use of the mark by the defendant, and (3)
costs associated with the action.19 This can be a tough burden of proof on a
plaintiff, as the biggest damages awards are often given out when “willful”
infringement is proven. “Willfulness” has proved to be a tricky concept in
trademark law. Recently, the Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff
must prove willful infringement in order to recover an infringer’s profits.20
The Court held that willful infringement is only one consideration for
awarding an infringer’s profits and is not a prerequisite.21 This was a
seemingly sound ruling, as it is unclear why willfulness should even matter.
Perhaps willful infringement seems more morally egregious, but if the goals
of trademark law are to prevent consumer confusion as well as unjust
enrichment, then an infringer’s profits should be awarded to a trademark
holder regardless of willfulness. A holding otherwise would have, and in fact
has, created uneven and contrary awards of damages.22 The difficulty of
17

Sardi’s Rest. Corp. v. Sardie, 755 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 1985).
See Mrs. U.S. Nat’l Pageant, Inc. v. Miss U.S. Org., LLC, 875 F. Supp. 2d 211, 226–27
(W.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting U.S. Polo Ass’n v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515, 540
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)) (noting that courts have held that “[i]rreparable harm exists in a trademark case when
the party seeking the injunction shows that it will lose control over the reputation of its trademark . . .
because loss of control over one’s reputation is neither ‘calculable nor precisely compensable’”)
(alterations in original); Hard Candy, LLC v. Anastasia Beverly Hills, Inc., 921 F.3d 1343, 1353 (11th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Angel Flight of Ga., Inc. v. Angel Flight Am., Inc. 522 F.3d 1200, 1209 (11th Cir.
2008)) (noting that courts grant injunctions against the infringing party because “‘the public deserves not
to be led astray by the use of inevitably confusing marks,’ and injunctive relief is the surest way to prevent
future harm”).
19
15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-193).
20
Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492, 1494 (2020). See also Lewis R. Clayton
& Eric Alan Stone, Supreme Court to Decide Willful Trademark Infringement Issue, 262 N.Y.L.J., Nov.
13, 2019 (providing a description of the dispute).
21
Romag Fasteners, 140 S. Ct. at 1497.
22
To illustrate this point, the Restatement notes that:
18

[t]he multiple rationales for an award of the defendant’s profits complicate analysis
of the applicable rules. . . . In many cases it is unnecessary to adopt a specific theory
since the consequences of the various rationales frequently overlap. In some cases,
however, it may be necessary to adjust the terms of the accounting to reflect the
specific objective sought by the award and the equities of the particular case.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 cmt. B (AM. L. INST. 1995). Indeed, before the
Romag decision, the federal circuits split over the issue of a bad faith, or willfulness, requirement for an
accounting of profits in order to calculate damages. For example, the Seventh Circuit did not require bad
faith, but the Second Circuit and a majority of other circuits did. Compare, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie &
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proving damages, or the inconsistent ways in which they are awarded, in
trademark cases is what makes alternative remedial schemes—such as
compulsory licensing—even more attractive.
The idea of “willful infringement” becomes even trickier in cases of
reverse confusion. In reverse confusion cases, the junior user typically has
no knowledge of the senior user’s mark or else believes it to be so remote
that there could be no possible conflict. The junior user “infringes” the mark
because it fits with its own branding or marketing plan. Thus, the
infringement often is not willful as the junior user is working on retaining
and building its own goodwill, rather than trying to capitalize on the
goodwill of the senior user,23 unlike direct confusion cases where the junior
user is often trying to capitalize on the goodwill and market recognition of
the senior user. Thus, courts often fail to find willfulness in cases of reverse
confusion, making it harder to create an appropriate remedy.
Further, a court may award treble damages and attorneys’ fees in the
case of an intentional infringement “unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances.”24 So even though punitive damages are not specifically
mandated in the Lanham Act, treble damages may be awarded in certain
circumstances, mainly within the court’s discretion, that seem to serve to
“punish” the infringer, or at least take away the infringer’s profits from using
the mark.25 Again, this has led to inconsistent results that could give some
trademark holders a windfall if a particular judge finds that infringement was
“intentional.” While an injunction against a trademark infringer makes
sense, both to avoid consumer confusion and to encourage investment in
branding and trademarks, it is clear that monetary damages do not always
work as smoothly. Further, it is clear that treble damages would not likely
be appropriate in reverse confusion cases as the junior user is most likely not
willfully or purposefully trading on any goodwill of the senior user.

Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989) (demonstrating that the Seventh Circuit did not require bad faith)
with George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1540 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the
requirement that bad faith or willfulness be shown for an award of profits under the theories of
compensation, unjust enrichment, and deterrence). This led to the circuit split resolution on willfulness
by the Supreme Court. See supra note 20 for a discussion of this.
23
See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 963 (7th Cir. 1992)
(discussing how it was clear that the infringing party independently adopted a similar mark as that of the
plaintiff and had no knowledge of plaintiff’s mark).
24
15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-193).
25
See, e.g., Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 489 (1853) (noting that “where the injury is
wanton or malicious, a jury may inflict [treble] damages, not to recompense the plaintiff, but to punish
the defendant”). The Seymour rhetoric has been noted as revealing an “unmistakable connection between
treble damages . . . and punitive damages.” Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1427, 1448–49 (2018).
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B. Case Law Treatment of Lanham Act Remedies in Reverse Confusion
Cases
As Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, a nationally renowned trademark
expert, has noted, “[t]here is a great deal of semantic confusion in the
opinions dealing with the award of monetary recovery for trademark
infringement and unfair competition.”26 This confusion occurs because there
are many different judicial opinions regarding the underlying purpose of
monetary relief in trademark cases, as the judiciary has been given very little
guidance from the text of the Lanham Act regarding monetary damages.27
The Ninth Circuit in particular noted the difficulty in calculating damages:
Damages are typically measured by any direct injury which a
plaintiff can prove, as well as any lost profits which the plaintiff
would have earned but for the infringement. Because proof of
actual damage is often difficult, a court may award damages
based on defendant’s profits on the theory of unjust enrichment.28
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning demonstrates that although the goal of
trademark remedies is to make the plaintiff whole, this is often impossible
to calculate under current remedial schemes, so a theory of unjust
enrichment of the infringer must be relied upon instead to calculate a proper
damages award.
Courts face a great challenge in calculating damages in reverse
confusion cases because “the injury primarily amounts to lost control of the
senior user’s mark, reputation, and goodwill.”29 Courts find it challenging to
assign a dollar value to these intangibles. In other words, the senior user in
cases of reverse confusion is not losing profits, and often the junior user is
not being unjustly enriched by trading off of the goodwill of the senior user.
Instead, the senior user just risks losing control over the mark and having
the market saturated by the junior user’s use of the mark. To illustrate the
courts’ challenges with assigning damages in cases of reverse confusion, it
is often helpful to see examples.
The seminal case involving a large damage award due to a finding of
reverse confusion was decided by the Seventh Circuit.30 In Sands, Taylor &
Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., the plaintiff, STW, was the owner of three

26
DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 16, at 981 (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:57, at 30:109 (4th ed. 2013)) (alteration in original).
27
McCarthy has noted that the various theories and rationales underlying trademark monetary
recovery “have received inadequate judicial attention and have remained confused and undefined.”
Dennis S. Corgill, Measuring the Gains of Trademark Infringement, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1909, 1915
n.25 (1997) (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 26, at § 30:58).
28
Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted).
29
Leah L. Scholer, Note, Righting the Wrong in Reverse Confusion, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 737, 740 (2004).
30
Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992).

218

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1

federally registered trademarks including the term “THIRST-AID,” though
the term had not been used on any beverages since a small test-run.31
When Quaker (defendant) adopted the phrase “Gatorade is Thirst Aid
for That Deep Down Body Thirst” in its advertising efforts for its sports
drink, Gatorade, STW filed suit, alleging federal trademark infringement
and unfair competition under the Lanham Act.32 The district court, finding
reverse confusion, held for STW and awarded it “10% of Quaker’s pre-tax
profits on Gatorade for the period during which Quaker used ‘Thirst Aid’ in
its advertising,” along with attorney’s fees and costs, which all totaled
$42,629,399.09 (approximately $25 million of which was the direct result
of a bad faith finding).33 The appellate court remanded the damages and
noted that “[a] reasonable royalty . . . would more accurately reflect both the
extent of Quaker’s unjust enrichment and the interest of STW that has been
infringed.”34 While the court here did reverse, other courts have given
plaintiffs in reverse confusion cases either a reasonable royalty or a
percentage of defendants’ profits.35 This percentage of profits is almost
certainly a windfall to plaintiffs.36 This is because the award was based on a
percentage of defendant’s profits, rather than on any profits of the plaintiff.37
The court of appeals, quoting the district court, even noted:
Defendant's profits may be significantly disproportionate to
plaintiff's circumstances, such that an award of profits may
represent punishment to the defendant (as opposed to
compensation for the plaintiff), and unjustifiable enrichment
and a windfall to the plaintiff. Therefore, the amount of profits
to be awarded should be related to the financial benefit
received because of the unlawful use of the mark.38
This statement demonstrates that it is likely the plaintiff received far more
in damages than it would have received in profits if it remained the sole user
of the THIRST AID mark—a conclusion that hardly seems equitable.
31

Id. at 951.
Id.
33
Id. at 949, 951, 961.
34
Id. at 963. This case was remanded for damages and then the decision was appealed again. Sands,
Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1994). The final award was $10,328,411 with
post-judgment interest. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., No. 84 C 8075, 1995 WL 221871,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 1995).
35
Daniel D. Domenico, Note, Mark Madness: How Brent Musburger and the Miracle Bra May
Have Led to a More Equitable and Efficient Understanding of the Reverse Confusion Doctrine in
Trademark Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 597, 631–32 (2000).
36
See id. at 623 (“[T]he damage actually suffered is inherently speculative . . . . The defendant in
such a case will generally be a large, solvent corporation. Thus, an award based on even a small
percentage of the junior user’s sales can yield very large numbers.”) (footnote omitted). The court in
Sands also stated that “an award of $24 million in profits is not ‘equitable’; rather, it is a windfall to the
plaintiff.” Sands, 978 F.2d at 963.
37
Sands, 34 F.3d at 1342.
38
Id.
32
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A case like Sands stands in sharp contrast with one like A & H
Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc.39 In A & H, plaintiff A & H
registered the trademark MIRACLESUIT for swimwear designed to make
the wearer appear slimmer.40 A & H manufactured approximately 10% of
all swimwear made in the United States.41 Two years later, defendant
Victoria’s Secret started using the term “The Miracle Bra” on lingerie and
swimsuits.42 A & H sued on a theory of trademark infringement based in part
on reverse confusion.43 On remand, the district court, finding infringement,
granted an injunction on the name “The Miracle Bra” in connection with
swimwear, but denied A & H any monetary relief.44
The court suggested three potential ways to calculate damages in the A
& H case, but all were rejected.45 First, the court suggested royalty payments
for past and future infringement, but this was rejected by the circuit court
because it seemed to impose a license that neither party requested or
negotiated.46 Second, the court considered awarding a percentage of
Victoria’s Secret’s profits, but rejected this as well because Victoria’s
Secret’s swimwear profits did not relate to the value of A & H’s mark, and
thus, its success was unrelated to the strength of A & H’s mark or any created
confusion.47 Third, the court considered any pecuniary losses due to the
infringement, but rejected this because it could find no evidence that
Victoria’s Secret gained sales because confused customers bought a
Victoria’s Secret swimsuit when they really wanted an A & H swimsuit.48
In comparing the Sands and A & H decisions, it is hard to make sense of
the wildly different damages awards. For one, it seems nonsensical that the
plaintiff in Sands should have been awarded approximately $24 million in
damages for infringement based on reverse confusion, when they arguably
were not even currently manufacturing a directly competing product as the
defendant’s, while the plaintiff in A & H, who manufactured 10% of the
swimwear produced in the United States, was awarded $0 in damages even
though their product competed directly with the defendant’s. Further, the
award given in Sands is almost certainly more than the plaintiff would have
received if the defendant had sought a license to use the mark. In both cases,
it is likely that the defendants were making a more economically efficient
use of the trademark, and should have been allowed to capitalize on that, while
fairly compensating the senior user. The inconsistencies of the damages
39

A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 208.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 209.
43
Id.
44
A & H Sportswear Co. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 770, 802 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
45
Id. at 773, 801.
46
Id. at 773.
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awards, the economic inefficiency of the injunctions, and the inability of
companies to capitalize on their marketing schemes due to smaller, remote
players are all problematic to a functioning trademark system.
Thus, this Note posits that in cases of reverse confusion in trademark
law, the remedial scheme needs to be revised. I will argue that it is often the
case that the junior user is actually better suited to make a much more
efficient use of the mark than the senior user and should be able to use it
under a compulsory licensing scheme. The senior user will be fairly
compensated for the mark, the junior user will be able to make efficient use
of the mark, and consumer confusion will be minimized. First, I will outline
how compulsory licensing schemes have worked in other intellectual
property regimes.
II. COMPULSORY LICENSING IN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT REGIMES
Compulsory licenses have been defined as “involuntary contracts
between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller, imposed or enforced by the
state.”49 “Additionally, compulsory licensing may be implemented as a
remedy in antitrust or misuse situations, where the invention is important to
national defense or where the entity acquiring the compulsory license is the
sovereign.”50 While a compulsory licensing system has not yet been
recognized in trademark law, it does exist to a limited extent in both patent
and copyright law. Here, I will give a brief explanation of those systems,
domestically and internationally, in order to provide a platform to discuss
that while a similar scheme might not always be appropriate in trademark
law in general, compulsory licenses may be an appropriate alternative to
traditional remedies in cases of reverse confusion.
A. Compulsory Licensing in the Patent System
Compulsory licensing became more common in the patent regime after
the United States Supreme Court decision in eBay v. MercExchange.51 The
Court in eBay reversed a grant for injunctive relief, despite a finding of
patent infringement.52 The Court held that a patent owner seeking injunctive
relief must demonstrate: (1) it has suffered irreparable harm; (2) monetary
damages are inadequate; (3) balancing the hardships to the parties warrants
equitable relief; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by an
injunction.53 Since this decision, injunctive relief has been granted to direct

49
Angela Foster, Compulsory Licensing After eBay, 258 N.J. LAW. 41, 43 (2009) (citing Gianna
Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349,
349 (1993)).
50
Julian-Arnold, supra note 49, at 350.
51
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
52
Id. at 394.
53
Id. at 391.
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patent competitors,54 but denied to non-competitors55 and patent owners not
practicing the patent.56
Because the Court in eBay did not provide guidance for alternative relief
when an injunction is denied but infringement has occurred, several posteBay patent infringement suits have resulted in a grant of compulsory
licensing agreements. For example, the district court in Paice v. Toyota
issued an order permitting Toyota to continue producing patent-infringing
items subject to a payment of $25 per engine to the patent owner.57 Based
on the eBay decision, the court determined that because Paice was not
competing for market share with Toyota, there was no threat to Paice and
therefore no reason to enjoin Toyota from using the patent, as long as they
paid the royalty.58 The district court used similar reasoning in Finisar Corp.
v. DirecTV Group when it applied a reasonable royalty rate awarded by a
jury for past damages and future uses of the patent by the defendant.59
In addition, some international patent law systems, such as the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (“the Paris
Convention”)60 and TRIPS,61 provide for compulsory licensing under certain
circumstances. For example, under TRIPS, the TRIPS member must pay the
patent owner a remuneration for use of the patented invention, and the use
must be specific in scope and duration, as well as limited to the authorized
purpose.62 This has allowed member countries to enforce compulsory licenses
in certain situations.
Therefore, a compulsory licensing system is alive and well in the
patent regime.

54
See, e.g., TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 671 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(granting a permanent injunction against a directly competing patent infringer).
55
See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (failing
to grant a permanent injunction against a non-competitor because the patentee failed to show that it would
suffer, and the negative effects on the public outweighed the granting of such relief).
56
See, e.g., Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742, at *2
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007) (denying an injunction where patent owner was not using the patent, but merely
licensing it).
57
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *3, *6 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 16, 2006).
58
Id. at *6.
59
Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380, at *4–5
(E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006).
60
The Paris Convention is the oldest major treaty concerning the protection of intellectual property.
Geri L. Haight & Philip Catanzano, The Effects of Global Priority of Trademark Rights, 91 MASS. L.
REV. 18, 24 (2007).
61
See supra note 11 for a description of TRIPS.
62
TRIPS, art. 31(c) & (h) (1994).
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B. Compulsory Licensing in the Copyright System
The first compulsory license provision for copyright law appeared in
Section 1(e) of the 1909 Copyright Revision Act.63 “It was enacted out of
fear that allowing exclusive recording licenses would create monopolies
over music.”64 The Act, which exists to this day for works that were created
before the 1976 Lanham Act went into effect, allows the payment of a
royalty to permit the making of a sound recording of a nondramatic musical
composition without the consent of the music’s copyright owner.65 While
this only applied to compulsory licensing for phonorecords, Congress added
three more compulsory licenses to the 1976 Copyright Revision Act for: (1)
the secondary transmission of certain primary transmissions (in other words,
a design that permits cable television to carry over-the-air broadcast
signals);66 (2) jukebox performances of copyrighted music;67 and (3) the
broadcast of published nondramatic musical works and published pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works by a public broadcasting entity.68 Since then,
three more compulsory licenses have been adopted for (1) secondary
transmissions by satellite carriers;69 (2) certain digital transmissions and
delivery of sound recordings;70 and (3) the manufacture and importation of
digital recording devices.71 These compulsory licenses for copyright make it
clear that Congress has found them to be an effective solution to resolve
problems involving conflicts between copyright owners and those who wish
to use copyrighted works.72
It has been noted that compulsory licensing for sound recordings
“satisfies the creative need for unrestricted access to recordings, creates a
legal channel for remix distribution, and makes the dividing line between
licensing and fair use one of commercial intent, much like the way cover songs
are already treated.”73 It creates a system where the general public is able to
enjoy new artistic creations while both benefiting new artists hoping to use
copyrighted works and still providing a licensing fee to copyright owners.74

63
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (amending and consolidating the Acts
respecting copyright) [hereinafter 1909 Copyright Act].
64
Michael L. Baroni, A Pirate’s Palette: The Dilemmas of Digital Sound Sampling and a Proposed
Compulsory License Solution, 11 U. MIA. ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 65, 93 (1993).
65
17 U.S.C.A. § 115 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-193).
66
Id. § 111(d) (Westlaw).
67
Id. § 116(b) (Westlaw).
68
Id. § 118(b)(4) (Westlaw).
69
Id. § 119(c)(1)(C) (Westlaw).
70
Id. §§ 114–15 (Westlaw).
71
Id. § 115(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Westlaw).
72
Howard B. Abrams, Copyright’s First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 215, 227 (2010).
73
Robert M. Vrana, Note, The Remix Artist’s Catch-22: A Proposal for Compulsory Licensing for
Transformative, Sampling-Based Music, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 811, 859 (2011).
74
Id. at 860.
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C. Economic Efficiency in Compulsory Licensing
Why do the patent and copyright systems utilize compulsory licensing?
Because it is an economically efficient way to resolve conflicts between
intellectual property owners and those who wish to use owned intellectual property.
As an example, compulsory licensing is often used in patent law in the
pharmaceutical industry. For instance, Thailand issued three compulsory
licenses for HIV/AIDS treatments as well as one for heart disease in 2006
and 2007 in order to provide the drugs to the poor within its public health
system.75 It was found that the compulsory licenses reduced prices and
improved access to crucial medications by introducing generic competition
where products were patented.76
As another example of efficient usage of compulsory licensing, “in 2006
. . . at least four courts in the United States issued compulsory licenses on
medical, software, and engineering patents to remedy anticompetitive
business practices.”77 Limiting anticompetitive and monopolistic practices
is a common, global goal, and compulsory licensing has been utilized
internationally to achieve those goals.78
It has in fact been noted that tensions have arisen between intellectual
property law and competition law.79 “Businesses have increasingly
understood that [intellectual property] can be used as a strategic weapon to
bolster their market power.”80 Businesses will often try to make it difficult
for their competitors to enter markets by creating entry barriers using their
intellectual property as both a sword and a shield.81 Thus, competition law
has sought to break some of these barriers with the essential facilities
doctrine (“EFD”) which mandates access to controlled facilities by requiring
compulsory licensing.82 EFD has been used in the United States to encourage
competition and prevent monopolistic behavior.83 For example, EFD has
surfaced in cases involving “bottleneck inputs” including sports stadiums,
warehouse spaces, and newspaper distribution systems.84 Recent cases
involving EFD have also focused on technological knowledge for access to
networks, including electricity and telecommunications “where there are
clear elements of natural monopoly and the presence of explicit

75
Peter Maybarduk & Sarah Rimmington, Compulsory Licenses: A Tool to Improve Global Access
to the HPV Vaccine?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 323, 330 (2009).
76
Id. at 331.
77
Id. at 330.
78
Id. at 330–31.
79
Daryl Lim, Copyright Under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the Essential Facilities Doctrine
and the Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted Works, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481, 486 (2007).
80
Id. at 486–87.
81
Id. at 487.
82
Id. at 488.
83
Id. at 489.
84
Id. at 488 n.22.
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regulation.”85 These uses of EFD encourage economic efficiency by
fostering competition and breaking down bottlenecks to market entry.
Although creating a reasonable licensing fee may seem daunting, some
literature has already begun to explore promising economic models to
properly calibrate the prices for compulsory licenses in copyright law.86 This
suggests that it is not only possible to create reasonable licensing fees, but
also necessary to promote a functioning economy.
The concern in reverse confusion cases is also the stifling of
competition. In some cases, senior users try to use their trademark
registration as a way to “shake down” a junior user who has already
independently spent advertising and marketing dollars towards a similar
mark.87 This type of anti-competitive behavior is economically inefficient,
and although the senior user should not be left without any sort of
compensation for their original mark, they also should not be allowed to
warehouse and exploit their registered marks. For marks that are not being
warehoused by the senior user but are still being used (albeit on a very small
scale), compulsory licensing can still create a more economically efficient
solution by making it easier for users to enter markets, like in copyright law.
III. COMPULSORY LICENSING IN TRADEMARK LAW
A. Why a Compulsory Licensing System is Needed in Trademark Law
While the TRIPS Agreement expressly allows the granting of
compulsory licenses under certain “reasonable commercial terms and
conditions,”88 it has generally not permitted any compulsory licensing of
trademarks.89 That being said, TRIPS also specifically allows countries to
take “[a]ppropriate measures” to “prevent the abuse of intellectual property
rights by right holders” or anti-competitive practices which restrain trade.90
Additionally, Article 40 states that:

85

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 552. See generally Eduardo M.R.A. Engel, Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, How
to Auction an Essential Facility when Underhand Integration is Possible (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 8146, 2001), http://www.nber.org/papers/w8146 (proposing a model that would
grant access to the firm that bids the lowest user fee).
87
As an example, the plaintiff in the Sands case purchased the trademark assignments for THIRST
AID for $1.00 and proceeded to use that assignment to try and get a payout from the defendant. Sands,
Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 1992). As another example, as will
be explained later in this Note as an illustration, a woman is trying to use her registered mark to induce
the Obamas to give her roles in their movies. This is reminiscent of the idea of “patent trolling,” whereby
individuals or companies will obtain the rights to one or more patents in order to profit by licensing and
litigating against infringers, rather than producing their own goods or services. This type of strategy is
problematic in trademark law which requires bona fide use in commerce of a registered mark.
88
TRIPS art. 31.
89
Id. art. 21.
90
Id. art. 8, para. 2.
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[n]othing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from
specifying in their legislation licensing practices or conditions
that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual
property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market . . . [A] Member may adopt, consistently with
the other provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures
to prevent or control such practices . . . .91
These two notions seem to be at odds. It seems nonsensical that countries
can adopt compulsory licensing schemes when they think it is necessary to
encourage competition in trade for copyright and patent law, but not for
trademark law. This is why TRIPS should be amended to allow for a
compulsory licensing scheme in trademark law, at least for cases of reverse
confusion. Small, remote users who warehouse marks stifle trade by not
allowing a bigger, junior user to use them more efficiently.
B. Possible Implementation
The main challenge in implementing a compulsory licensing scheme in
trademark law would be determining what the rate would be for the license
to the senior user. Courts or arbitrators should aim to maximize economic
efficiency without overburdening the junior user, while still granting a fair
value to the senior user.92
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Sands posited that a damages
award could resemble a “generous approximation” of a royalty rate.93 The
same baseline could be applied to a compulsory license. This approach is
already well-supported under the Lanham Act, which dictates that an
appropriate award of damages is compensation for the senior user’s loss, and
should not include a deterrence factor (despite previous discussion of courts
wishing to deter trademark infringers).94 Therefore, in cases of reverse
confusion, courts often award a reasonable royalty for infringement as
damages.95 If this reasonable royalty were just applied at the outset of the
litigation as a compulsory licensing fee, the system could avoid a lot of
unnecessary and costly litigation where neither party, nor the general
consuming public, are really made better off. Rather, the judge or arbitrator
should determine what rate the senior user could reasonably expect from the
junior user if the parties were able to successfully negotiate.
Another way to look at determining a reasonable rate for a compulsory
licensing system can be borrowed from copyright law. In the United States,
91

Id. art. 40, para. 2.
See Sands, 978 F.2d at 963 (discussing how a reasonable royalty rate could create an equitable
result for both the senior and junior users).
93
Id.
94
15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-193).
95
Scholer, supra note 29, at 756.
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the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 established the
Copyright Royalty Judges (“Judges”) program.96 These Judges oversee the
copyright law’s statutory licenses.97 The Judges determine and adjust royalty
rates and terms applicable to the statutory copyright licenses, as well as
oversee distribution of royalties.98 The rates and terms for compulsory
licenses for internet radio are to be determined by the Judges under the
“willing buyer, willing seller” standard.99 This standard directs the Judges to
“establish rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that
would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and
a willing seller.”100 The standard further directs the Judges to:
[B]ase their decision on economic, competitive, and
programming information presented by the parties, including –
(I) whether use of the service may substitute for or may
promote the sales of phonorecords or otherwise may interfere
with or may enhance the sound recording copyright owner’s
other streams of revenue from its sound recordings; and
(II) the relative roles of the copyright owner and the
transmitting entity in the copyrighted work and the service
made available to the public with respect to relative creative
contribution, technological contribution, capital investment,
cost, and risk.
[In establishing such rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty
Judges] may consider the rates and terms for comparable types
of digital audio transmission services and comparable
circumstances under voluntary license agreements.101
A similar licensing scheme for reverse confusion cases in trademark law
can be adopted from this copyright standard. Congress could, and indeed
should, implement a similar board of well-practiced trademark attorneys and
judges who could adopt similar standards to determine what a fair rate would
be for a junior trademark user to pay a senior user (“Trademark Panel”).
They could recruit from the United States Patent and Trademark Office
where examining attorneys and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board judges
are familiar with the ins and outs of trademark law application.
Based on the standards in copyright law, the Trademark Panel could
look to the business, economic, and competitive information provided to
96
Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–419, 118 Stat. 2341
§ 3 replacing 17 U.S.C. 801. See also About Us, U.S. COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD, https://www.crb.gov
/index.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2020) (showing the website that explains the function of the Copyright
Royalty Judges).
97
About Us, supra note 96.
98
Id.
99
17 U.S.C.A. § 114(f)(1)(B) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-193).
100
Id.
101
Id. at § 114(f)(1)(B)(i)–(ii).
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them by the parties. If the senior user clearly had a large market share and
competitive reach, the Trademark Panel could dismiss the case and the
junior user would either have to abandon the mark, or risk litigation by the
senior user.
If, however, the case is not so clear, then the Trademark Panel could
create a licensing fee (or perhaps still dismiss the case) by looking at factors
such as: whether consumers are likely to be confused as to ownership or
affiliation of the marks; whether the junior user’s use of the mark would
interfere with or hinder the business of the senior user; the current marketing
levels and reasonable market expansion of the senior user (in order to
determine their present and future geographic reach); the relative economic
size of both parties; any comparable voluntary license agreements in the
same industry as the parties; the amount of capital expenditures by both
parties in regards to the mark in question; and the public interest in the
matter. The Trademark Panel might also consider willful infringement as
evidence that the senior user is making economic use of the mark. For
example, where there is evidence that a junior user willfully took the mark
of a junior user, that would lead to a higher priced compulsory license.
Any situation in which the senior user might actually be harmed by the
junior user’s entry into the market using the mark would either preclude the
case, or else create a vastly high licensing fee that may deter the junior user.
A senior user could demonstrate harm by showing actual customer
confusion as well as loss of profits due to the junior user’s adoption of the
mark. On the other hand, where the senior user has spent very little on
marketing and is not operating or planning to operate in a large geographic
zone, the licensing fee would be lowered. Further, if similar but voluntary
licenses have been negotiated by other parties for trademarks in the same or
similar industries, the Trademark Panel could use that as a baseline for
determining what a reasonable licensing fee should be—that in particular
would be a clear case of what a “willing buyer” would be willing to pay and
what a “willing seller” would be willing to accept. Finally, the public interest
should be considered. Where it seems that a mark is being warehoused in a
remote geographic region or to a very limited number of consumers, the
public interest, and indeed economic efficiency, would be served by setting
a reasonable, lower rate for a licensing fee.
Of course, this approach does deprive the senior user of another benefit
it may have received through litigation—an injunction against the junior
user’s use of the alleged infringing mark. As previously illustrated, however,
it makes no rational economic sense for a small, senior user to be able to
warehouse a mark when it could be better utilized by a larger, junior user.
Accordingly, if the senior user were large enough or using the mark
prominently, it would be able to file a case of infringement using the normal
standard of confusion, rather than relying on a theory of reverse confusion.
Further, per the Dawn Donut standard of trademark law, if a senior user were
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able to prove that they had concrete plans to expand their market share, this
compulsory licensing scheme would not apply.102 Thus, what we are really
concerned with here is very small users who have no plans to expand their
use of the mark, who likely will not be greatly harmed by the junior user’s
use of the mark, and whose continuing, concurrent use is not likely to cause
consumer confusion.
C. An Illustration
To provide an example of how this compulsory licensing scheme makes
economic as well as practical sense, and how it could work in practice, I
present the following real-world example of an ongoing trademark battle
that could quickly and efficiently be resolved by my proposed scheme.103
Though this is just one example, the analysis provided could certainly be
expanded to other cases of reverse confusion.
Recently, former President and First Lady, Barack and Michelle Obama,
sought to trademark their production company’s name, Higher Ground
Productions104 (specifically for media production services), but were given
a § 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion Refusal by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office because of its similarity to an already registered mark,
HIGHER GROUND ENTERPRISES105 (registered for photography and
publishing services including books, e-books, audio, music, etc.), owned by
Hanisya Massey.106 HIGHER GROUND ENTERPRISES is used by Ms.
Massey for her consulting website that offers photography, e-book guides
and manuals, audiobooks, training, and development to assist with her
clients’ audio and visual needs.107 After negotiations between the Obamas
and Ms. Massey failed, the Obamas filed a petition to cancel Ms. Massey’s
mark on the grounds that she was not actively using it to conduct business—
a very “fact-intensive inquiry that could take years to sort out.”108 Ms.
Massey maintains that she has continually run her business and has indicated

102
See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959) (noting that
“if the use of the marks by the registrant and the unauthorized user are confined to two sufficiently distinct
and geographically separate markets, with no likelihood that the registrant will expand his use into
defendant’s market, so that no public confusion is possible, then the registrant is not entitled to enjoin
the junior user’s use of the mark.” It follows from this that where a plaintiff is able to show genuine intent
to expand its use of the mark, it may enjoin a junior user.).
103
When a trademark is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Officer, it must be
done in capital letters; to match this practice, all trademarks discussed in this example will be in capitals.
104
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 87930586 (filed May 21, 2018).
105
HIGHER GROUND ENTERPRISES, Registration No. 5260404.
106
USPTO, Suspension Notice, Serial No. 87930586 (Oct. 3, 2019); Nancy Coleman, The Obamas
Want ‘Higher Ground.’ Someone Got There First., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/arts/television/the-obamas-want-higher-ground-someone-gotthere-first.html?action=click&module=News&pgtype.
107
HIGHER GROUND ENTERPRISES, https://www.onhigherground.net/ (2020).
108
Coleman, supra note 106.
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that she has a website as well as customer invoices and advertisements to
offer as proof of her commercial use of the mark.109
Because private negotiations have failed (a sticking point being that the
Obamas are unwilling to comply with Ms. Massey’s demand for roles in the
Obama films), this has become a case of two extremes. Either the Obamas are
successful in their petition to cancel Ms. Massey’s mark and she loses all
rights to it, or Ms. Massey wins a claim for trademark infringement and the
Obamas lose their right to the mark and quite likely will have to pay Ms.
Massey damages.110 Either is a highly economically inefficient result. Ms.
Massey does indeed seem to have a customer following that would be harmed
if she were to lose the mark.111 Additionally, the Obamas have a production
deal with Netflix,112 as well as their own huge following,113 and would
certainly be harmed if they were to lose the ability to use the mark because
consumers have already begun to associate the mark with the Obamas. The
Obamas would have to restart their marketing campaign if they were forced
to adopt a new name. It seems nonsensical that they cannot both use the mark
simultaneously— Ms. Massey for her current, small business based out of
California,114 and the Obamas for their large production company.
How can this be resolved without a successful private negotiation or
prolonged litigation? Compulsory licensing. Under my proposed compulsory
licensing scheme for trademark law, the Obamas could simply continue to use
Higher Ground Productions as their business name but pay a reasonable fee to
Ms. Massey. Ms. Massey could keep operating under HIGHER GROUND
ENTERPRISES and receive an influx of cash, while the Obamas could
continue to operate under their chosen name. Both parties win, and the public
can continue to enjoy both services without having to expend transaction costs
to figure out what trademark the Obamas are operating under, since they have
already begun productions under Higher Ground.
To determine what a reasonable licensing fee would be in this case, the
Trademark Panel would look to factors outlined in Section III(B) of this
discussion. Of course, determining conclusively how each of these factors
109

Id.
It should be noted here that the Obamas’ trademark application was a 1(b) Intent to Use
application, meaning that when they applied for the mark, they were not currently using it in commerce.
U.S. Trademark Application, supra note 104. While a mark that is not currently in use cannot be
infringing, the Obamas have begun using the mark in commerce since they applied for it. Thus, it is likely
that if the Obamas are successful in their petition to cancel Ms. Massey’s mark, they will submit a
Statement of Use to the USPTO to demonstrate the mark’s use in commerce and obtain registration.
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Coleman, supra note 106.
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See John Koblin, The Obamas and Netflix Just Revealed the Shows and Films They’re Working
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See Jeffrey M. Jones, Obama, Trump Tie as Most Admired Man in 2019, GALLUP (Dec. 30,
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would apply would require testimony from both parties (that would be given
directly to the Trademark Panel in my proposed scheme), but I will briefly
discuss each by using what I can ascertain about each of the parties.
1. Are consumers likely to be confused as to the ownership or
affiliation of the marks?
It seems highly unlikely that any reasonable, rational consumer would
think that Ms. Massey’s small consulting company would be in any way
owned by or affiliated with the Obamas’ production company and vice
versa. Further, since Ms. Massey has been operating for years and relies on
customer testimony to draw in new customers, it seems unlikely that
customers will be confused in the reverse and think that Ms. Massey is
attempting to trade off the goodwill of the Obamas’ production company. It
seems clear that they are two separate and independently created entities.
Thus, the consumer confusion in this case would be minimal if both parties
continued to operate using the trademark.
2. Would the Obamas’ use of the mark interfere with or hinder Ms.
Massey’s business?
Ms. Massey has claimed that the Obamas’ use is already interfering with
her business. “It could definitely hurt my business severely,” she has
reportedly said.115 “Because if you Google this, [the trademark battle] is the
only thing that comes up. And I am pretty much a little needle in the haystack
at this point.”116
While this may be true, it is harder to see how the Obamas’ use of the
trademark will harm her business in the long run. This is especially true if
this had been handled another way (i.e., through a compulsory license
instead of the cancellation petition). Ms. Massey’s claimed harm is directly
related to the publicity generated from the trademark battle, which could
have been avoided.
Furthermore, people who need assistance with audio and visual needs in
Ms. Massey’s general geographic area are still likely to find Ms. Massey’s
site if her marketing strategy is sound. They are very unlikely to get confused
into thinking that the Obamas’ Higher Ground Productions is the computer
help they are searching for. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the Obamas’
use of the trademark is really harming Ms. Massey’s business.
3. What are Ms. Massey’s current marketing levels and is there any
reasonably expected market expansion?
It has been stated that the lawyer for the Obamas only filed the
cancellation petition for Ms. Massey’s HIGHER GROUND ENTERPRISES
mark “after having difficulty finding evidence of Ms. Massey’s company or
115
116
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use of the trademark.”117 A trademark must be being actively used in
interstate commerce to remain valid,118 so presumably the lawyer would
have done searching on the web and other business resources to try and find
proof that Ms. Massey has been actively using her mark in commerce.
Ms. Massey claims that she has invoices to clients, advertisements, and
client testimonies to prove that she has been actively using her mark in
commerce.119 And while it may be true that she is still actively using the mark,
it seems that she is not using it extensively. According to The New York Times,
her company’s Internet presence was dormant for years.120 In fact, the website
for her business was still in development as of September 4, 2019, a few weeks
after the Obamas filed their petition to cancel her mark, but then was up and
running on September 5 (quite likely in response to the petition).121
This evidence all suggests that while Ms. Massey may still be using her
mark, the scope of her use is not great. It seems that her marketing levels are
quite low, perhaps mostly localized to her geographic area of Covina,
California. There has been no public showing that I could find that
demonstrates Ms. Massey’s desire to expand her business outside the Covina
area. However, I could not confirm that without actual testimony. Further,
there seems to be no evidence that Ms. Massey intended to expand her mark
into video and film productions.
4. What is the relative economic size and market reach of both parties?
The only economic data I could find on Ms. Massey’s company, Higher
Ground Enterprises LLC, comes from Manta.com, an online searchable
database of small businesses.122 According to Manta.com, Higher Ground
Enterprises LLC has annual estimated revenue of $160,000.123
In contrast, the Obamas’ production company, Higher Ground Productions,
is likely worth a great deal more. Although current financials seem to be
publicly unavailable and it is also currently unknown how much their deal
with Netflix generated for the Obamas, the amount is likely well into the
tens of millions, if not more. As evidence, in March of 2018, Penguin
Random House signed the couple to a joint book deal that pays them $65
117
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million for their memoirs.124 Their recent multi-year deal with Netflix will
allow them to reach approximately 148 million paying Netflix subscribers
in the United States alone.125 Worldwide, Netflix has 125 million subscribers
who could access the content from the Obamas’ production company.126
Their first film, American Factory, won the Oscar for Best Documentary
this year.127 The Obamas’ Higher Ground has also reached a partnership
agreement with the streaming service, Spotify, to produce podcasts that will
reach up to 217 million active monthly users across the globe.128 Financial
terms of this deal were not disclosed,129 but it is certainly further evidence
of the Obama company’s vast market reach.
5. Have there been any comparable voluntary license agreements for
a trademark in the media industry?
There is a plethora of voluntary trademark licenses in the media industry
that could be used as baselines for this analysis. As an example, in 2010, the
Walt Disney Company, which has a huge media presence, “was the
top-ranked global licensing company, with a reported $28.6 billion in total
retail sales of licensed merchandise.”130
The Trademark Panel could look to licenses like these from Disney, or
other media companies, to determine a baseline for what a willing buyer of
a license is normally willing to pay and a willing seller is normally willing
to accept.
6. How much have both parties spent in regard to marketing “Higher
Ground”?
I could not find much information to answer this factor, however, as
demonstrated from factor (3), it seems clear that Ms. Massey’s marketing
presence is minimal.
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In contrast, the Obamas seem to be marketing Higher Ground heavily as
evidenced from their recent deals with both Netflix and Spotify.
7. How would the public interest best be served?
The public interest would be best served by allowing both the Obamas
and Ms. Massey to use the name Higher Ground. This is not only the most
economically efficient use of the trademark in that more consumers will be
exposed to the name; it also avoids confusion. It seems highly unlikely that
anyone would confuse Ms. Massey’s consulting business with the Obamas’
production conglomerate.
Additionally, it avoids unnecessary transaction costs from private
negotiations (or even mediation or arbitration), as well as all costs associated
with litigation—attorneys’ fees, costs to do depositions and collect evidence,
court fees, and other related costs, as the Trademark Panel would get
involved when a complaint is first brought, thus avoiding court fees.131
Cutting out these costs by implementing a compulsory licensing system
would reduce much economic waste, as well as free up valuable court
resources which would surely be in the public’s interest.
Weighing all the factors together, most if not all seem to cut in favor of
the Obamas. Again, testimony and more solid financial information from
both parties would greatly help to solidify this analysis. However, it seems
clear that the Obamas are making a much larger and more global use of
Higher Ground, whereas Ms. Massey is using it for a very small, remote
purpose. Therefore, it seems plausible that a panel of Judges could, using the
available evidence, create a reasonable licensing fee that the Obamas could
pay to Ms. Massey, therefore allowing both of them to use the mark in
question, while maximizing its economic efficiency.
While this is just one example of where a compulsory licensing system
could be efficiently and effectively applied in trademark law, the principle
is applicable to other cases of reverse confusion. For example, in the Sands
case discussed earlier, the defendant could have paid a (likely nominal)
licensing fee to the plaintiff in order to avoid the years of litigation. In A &
H, the defendant could have paid a (probably larger) licensing fee. These
results would have come from individual testimonies in front of a Trademark
Panel, rather than years-long depositions and litigations, which likely
created a mountain of legal fees.
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CONCLUSION
It is important to “recognize that a compulsory license is not a complete
loss” for the registered trademark owner.132 Any compulsory license that
may be awarded to a junior user would provide for a fair payment to the
senior user, even if that payment may not be to the level preferred by the
right holder.
This compulsory licensing scheme for trademarks is especially equitable
in cases of reverse confusion where a senior user can make more
economically efficient use of the mark for the betterment of the general
public. Thus, TRIPS should be amended, and the United States should adopt
a law allowing for compulsory licenses in cases of reverse trademark
confusion. This will allow for economic efficiency, compensation for the
junior user, expanded trade, and will result in minimal consumer confusion.
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